Iraq and Article 51: A Correct Use of Limited Authority by Yoxall, Thomas
COMMENT
THOMAS YOXALL*
Iraq and Article 51: A Correct Use
of Limited Authority
After requesting more American troops to report to Saudi Arabia, President
George Bush orders a full-scale attack on Saddam Hussein's Iraqi forces in
Kuwait. Asked to justify these actions, President Bush immediately and confi-
dently refers to article 51 of the United Nations Charter and its provisions for
self-defense and collective security.
Whether the rest of the members of the United Nations, especially the Soviet
Union and China, would have concurred in this reasoning or questioned its
validity might have been a serious question for President Bush to ponder. A
reliance solely on article 51 likely would have resulted in the United States
fighting Iraq alone, and in the other members of the United Nations critically
analyzing such a reliance. Fortunately, with the passage of United Nations Se-
curity Council Resolution 678, authorizing the use of force against Iraq, the
United States no longer had to base its justifications for possible military inter-
vention solely on article 51. When U.S., British, Saudi Arabian, and Kuwaiti
planes descended upon Iraq on January 17, 1991, they had the solid support of
an appropriate Security Council resolution behind them rather than the arguably
weak support of only article 51 of the U.N. Charter.'
The Iraq-Kuwait situation provided the United Nations and the United States
with an opportunity to posture on and strengthen the virtues of international law
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and world order. The seemingly congenial relationship developing between the
United States and the Soviet Union, as well as the unsavory nature of Hussein
and his actions, presented the United States with a prime situation in which to
legitimize international law. The world may never again have such circumstances
requiring solidarity against an aggressor.
Immediately after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the United States invoked article
51 of the U.N. Charter in order to promulgate sanctions against Iraq. 2 While
article 51 was an effective temporary remedy against Iraq, the United States
correctly chose, for the sake of international order, to invoke other charter
provisions, specifically Chapter VII, before proceeding aggressively against
Iraq.3 A reliance solely on article 51 would have damaged not only the U.S.
stance, but international law as well. The apparent end of the Cold War has
created new unity in the United Nations.4 In order to maintain this solidarity, the
United States wisely relied on charter provisions other than article 51 before
commencing military action on January 17, 1990. 5
I. The Iraqi Invasion and the Subsequent Responses
On August 2, 1990, Iraqi troops poured over the border of Kuwait, an ally of
the United States, after massing over 100,000 troops on the borders. 6 By 5:00
A.M. on that day, the Iraqis had entered the seaport capital of Kuwait, Kuwait
City, and reportedly had inflicted severe casualties. 7 In response to threats from
world powers, Hussein stated that he would turn Kuwait into a graveyard if any
outside countries intervened. 8
Both the United Nations and the United States reacted swiftly to the Iraqi
invasion. The U.N. response was embodied in twelve resolutions passed by the
Security Council, which is composed of fifteen members. 9 The U.S. response
was reflected in its imposition of trade sanctions against Iraq and its sending of
2. "Mr. Baker announced yesterday that the U.S. had just received a formal request from the
legitimate government of Kuwait to implement sanctions under article 51 of the U.N. Charter." Fin.
Times, Aug. 13, 1990, at 12.
3. Scheffer, A Way Around the War Powers Trap, Chicago Tribune, Sept. 25, 1990, at 13, col.
I [hereinafter Scheffer, A Way Around].
4. Strasser, Iraq Clash Tests New Alliances, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 3, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
5. Scheffer, In the U.N. Charter, Room for an Assault on the Iraqis, Int'l Herald Tribune, Oct.
20-21, 1990, at 4, col. 3 [hereinafter Scheffer, In the U.N. Charter].
6. Wall St. J., Aug. 2, 1990, at 1, col. 3.
7. N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1990, at Al, col. 6.
8. Wall St. J., Aug. 2, 1990, at A5, col. 2. To justify his invasion of Kuwait, Hussein claimed
that his troops had entered the country at the request of a revolutionary group that had overthrown
the government.
9. D. Scheffer, Background Paper: The United Nations in the Gulf Crisis and Options for U.S.
Policy 2 (Oct. 1990) prepared for the United Nations Association of the United States of America
(UNA-USA) (available at the request of Mr. Scheffer or the UNA-USA) [hereinafter Scheffer, The
United Nations in the Gulf]. The membership of the Security Council includes the five permanent
members: the United States, the Soviet Union, France, the United Kingdom, and the People's
Republic of China; and the ten nonpermanent members: Canada, Finland, Colombia, Cuba, Ethiopia,
Malaysia, the Ivory Coast, Romania, Yemen, and Zaire.
VOL. 25, NO. 4
IRAQ AND ARTICLE 51 969
extensive military support to the Saudi Arabian peninsula and the Persian Gulf in
order to enforce President Bush's four objectives in this crisis. 10
A. THE U.N. RESPONSE
The reaction of the Security Council reflected broad disapproval of Iraq's
actions in Kuwait. Because Hussein was threatening international peace and se-
curity, the U.N. Charter bestowed on the Security Council the right and duty to
take action against Iraq. 11 Article 23 of the U.N. Charter establishes the Security
Council, while article 24 of the U.N. Charter provides it with the power and
responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. 12 The U.N. Char-
ter bestows on the Security Council the power to act on behalf of all the members
of the United Nations. It obligates all members to abide by any duties the
Security Council imposes upon them in the interest of international peace. 13
Article 25 of the charter imposes these obligations on the other members of the
General Assembly. 14 Although the actual power of the Security Council has been
suspect in the past, the Security Council exhibited strong resolve and unity in the
Iraq-Kuwait situation.
Immediately after the invasion of Kuwait, the Security Council began passing
binding resolutions against Iraq to be enforced by all of the members of the
United Nations. On August 2, 1990, the Security Council passed Resolution 660,
a general condemnation of the invasion. 15 The authorities cited by the Security
Council for this resolution were articles 39 and 40 of the U.N. Charter. 16 Four
10. Scheffer, United Nations and International Law Are Flying High, But Real Test Is to Come,
L.A. Times, Sept. 2, 1990, at 2, col. 3 [hereinafter Scheffer, United Nations and International Law].
President Bush's four objectives in sending troops to Saudi Arabia included: the immediate, com-
plete, and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait; the restoration of Kuwait's gov-
ernment; security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf; and the protection of American
citizens abroad.
11. See U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para. 1.
12. U.N. CHARTER art. 23, para. 1:
The Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United
States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect ten other
Members of the United Nations to be nonpermanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially
paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international
peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.
Id. art. 24, para 1: "In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its
Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security
Council acts on their behalf."
13. L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO, A. SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY
AND DOCUMENTS 202-03 (3d ed. 1969) [hereinafter L. GOODRICH].
14. U.N. CHARTER art 25: "The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out
the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter."
15. Scheffer, The United Nations in the Gulf, supra note 9, at 2. Security Council Resolution 660
condemned the invasion of Iraq; demanded immediate and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal; and
ordered the two countries to commence immediate negotiations.
16. U.N. CHARTER art. 39: "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what
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days later, acting under the auspices of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which
encompasses articles 39 through 51, the Security Council passed Resolution 661,
the general trade embargo against Iraq. 17 Chapter VII of the charter provides the
United Nations with war-making authority in reaction to acts of aggression. 18 In
a unanimous vote by the Security Council, the fifteen members passed Resolu-
tion 662, which called for a nullification of the annexation of Kuwait and stated
that the annexation maintained no legal validity and should not be recognized. 19
In its longest delay between resolutions up to that point, the Security Council
passed Resolution 664 on August 18, 1990, calling for Iraq to allow the imme-
diate departure of foreign nationals and to take no actions that might endanger
their lives. 20 The Security Council again invoked the broad provisions of Chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter to justify this resolution. 21 On August 25, 1990, the
measures shall be taken in accordance with articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international
peace and security.
Id. art. 40:
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations
or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such
provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures hall be without prejudice to
the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to
comply with such provisional measures.
17. N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1990, at A9, col. 5. Security Council Resolution 661 contained, in
part, the following provisions:
3. DECIDES that all states hall prevent:
a. The import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait exported therefrom
after the date of this resolution:
b. Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which would promote or are calculated to promote the
export or transhipment of any commodities or products from Iraq or Kuwait; and any dealings by their nationals
or their flag vessels or in their territories in any commodities or products originating in Iraq or Kuwait and exported
therefrom after the date of this resolution, including in particular any transfer of funds to Iraq or Kuwait for the
purpose of such activities or dealings;
c. The sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels of any commodities or
products, including weapons or any other military equipment, whether or not originating in their territories but not
including supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs, to any
person or body in Iraq or Kuwait or to any person or body for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated
from Iraq or Kuwait, and any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to
promote such sale, or supply or use of such commodities or products;
4. DECIDES that all states shall not make available to the Government of Iraq or to any commercial, industrial
or public utility undertaking in Iraq or Kuwait, any funds or any other financial or economic resources and shall
prevent their nationals and any persons within their territories from removing from their territories or otherwise
making available to that government or to any such undertaking any such funds or resources and from remitting
any other funds to persons or bodies within Iraq or Kuwait, except payments exclusively for strictly medical or
humanitarian purposes, and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs ....
18. Righter, U.N. Runs out of Steam in the Real World of Power Politics, The Times (London),
Aug. 25, 1990, at 2, col. 1. Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter requires the Security Council to act
initially through peaceful measures if its demands are disobeyed by the violating country. If the
Security Council believes afterwards that these measures are insufficient, it may authorize whatever
air, sea, or land forces are required to repel the aggressor.
19. Reuters Library Report, Aug. 9, 1990. The key provisions in Security Council Resolution
662 were:
1. DECIDES that annexation of Kuwait by Iraq under any form and whatever pretext has no legal validity, and
is considered null and void.
2. CALLS UPON all states, international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize that annexation,
and to refrain from any action or dealing that might be interpreted as an indirect recognition of the annexation.
3. FURTHER DEMANDS that Iraq rescind its actions purporting to annex Kuwait.
20. Scheffer, The United Nations in the Gulf, supra note 9, at 3.
21. Reuters Library Report, Aug. 19, 1990. Pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter,
Security Council Resolution 664 stated in part:
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Security Council demonstrated its seriousness with regard to the situation when
it enacted Resolution 665.22 While Resolution 661 called for trade sanctions
against Iraq, Resolution 665 requested states that maintained vessels in the
Persian Gulf to enforce the Resolution 661 trade sanctions, pursuant to Chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter, by providing maritime assistance.23
The next resolution reflected the Security Council's ability to exhibit human-
itarian concerns while concurrently condemning the actions of Iraq. Resolution
666, passed on September 14, 1990, pursuant to Chapter VII, provided that
foodstuffs and medical supplies should be sent to Iraq and Kuwait upon the
recommendations of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.24 Two days
later, the Security Council regained its previous aggressive stance and passed
Resolution 667 pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.25 Through this
resolution, the fifteen members expressed their concerns for the safety of diplo-
matic personnel and vigorously condemned any aggressive actions by Iraq
against such individuals in Kuwait.
26
1. DEMANDS that Iraq permit and facilitate the immediate departure from Kuwait and Iraq of the nationals of third
countries and grant immediate and continuing access of consular officials to such nationals;
2. FURTHER DEMANDS that traq take no action to jeopardize the safety, security or health of such nationals;
3. REAFFIRMS its decision in resolution 662 (1990) that annexation of Kuwait by Iraq is null and void, and
therefore demands that the government of Iraq rescind its orders for the closure of diplomatic and consular missions
in Kuwait and the withdrawal of the immunity of their personnel, and refrain from any such actions in the future;
4. REQUESTS the Secretary General to report to the Council on compliance with this resolution at the earliest
possible time.
22. See Scheffer, The United Nations in the Gulf, supra note 9, at 3.
23. The Times (London), Aug. 27, 1990, at 2, col. 6. Security Council Resolution 665 made the
following request of member states:
1. CALLS UPON those member states co-operating with the government of Kuwait which are deploying maritime
forces to the area to use such measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary under the
authority of the Security Council to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify
their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the provisions related to such shipping laid
down in resolution 661 (1990);
2. INVITES member states accordingly to cooperate as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the provisions
of resolution 661 (1990) with maximum use of political and diplomatic measures, in accordance with paragraph
one above;
3. REQUESTS all states to provide in accordance with the Charter such assistance as may be required by the states
referred to in paragraph one of this resolution;
4. FURTHER REQUESTS the states concerned to coordinate their actions in pursuit of the above paragraphs of
this resolution using as appropriate mechanisms of the Military Staff Conitninee and after consultation with the
Secretary-Genera to submit reports to the Security Council and its committee established under Resolution 661
(1990) to facilitate the monitoring of the implementation of this resolution; ....
24. Reuters Library Report, Sept. 14, 1990. Pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter,
Security Council Resolution 666 stated, in part,:
3. REQUESTS, for the purposes of paragraphs I and 2 of this resolution, that the Secretary-Genera seek urgently,
and on a continuing basis, information from relevant United Nations and other appropriate humanitarian agencies
and all other sources on the availability of food in Iraq and Kuwait, such information to be communicated by the
Secretary-General to the Committee regularly;
4. REQUESTS FURTHER that in seeking and supplying such information particular attention will be paid to
such categories of persons who might suffer specially, such as children under 15 years of age, expectant mothers,
and maternity cases, the sick and the elderly;
5. DECIDES that if the Committee, after receiving the reports from the Secretary-General, determines that
circumstances have arisen in which there is an urgent humanitarian need to supply foodstuffs to Iraq or Kuwait in
order to relieve human suffering, it will report promptly to the Council its decision as to how such need should be
met ....
25. Scheffer, The United Nations in the Gulf, supra note 9, at 4.
26. N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1990, at A 1l, col. 5. Security Council Resolution 667 provided, in part:
1. STRONGLY CONDEMNS aggressive acts perpetrated by Iraq against diplomatic premises and personnel in
Kuwait, including the abduction of foreign nationals who were present in those premises;
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The later resolutions enacted against Iraq returned to the arena of economic
sanctions. Aware that the imposition of sanctions against a country not only
presented hardships for that country, but also for the sanctioning countries, the
Security Council passed Resolution 669. This resolution called for the Sanctions
Committee, created in Resolution 661, to review requests for assistance from
states faced with specific economic problems related to the imposition of trade
sanctions against Iraq. 27 The Security Council enacted Resolution 669 pursuant
to article 50 of the U.N. Charter.2 s
On September 25, 1990, again acting pursuant to the broad provisions of
Chapter VII, the Security Council passed Resolution 670.29 While Resolution
665 provided for maritime enforcement of the trade sanctions, the latest resolu-
tion was intended to provide the means by which the United Nations could enlist
an air embargo to enforce overall sanctions against Iraq under Resolution 661.30
Notably, the Security Council provided in this resolution that if a nation breached
the trade sanctions or air embargo, the Security Council would consider mea-
sures to be taken against the violating state.
3
'
After more than a month without formal action, the Security Council passed
its tenth resolution against Iraq. Resolution 674, passed on October 29, 1990,
indicated to the aggressors that international law refused to allow profit through
aggression by reminding Iraq that it would be liable for any loss, damage, or
injury as a result of its invasion and plundering of Kuwait. 32 Aside from making
2. DEMANDS the immediate release of those foreign nationals as well as all nationals mentioned in resolution 664
(1990);
3. FURTHER DEMANDS that Iraq immediately and fully comply with its international obligations under
resolutions 660 (1990), 662 (1990), and 664 (1990) of the Security Council, the Vienna Conventions on diplomatic
and consular relations and international law;
4. FURTHER DEMANDS that Iraq immediately protect the safety and well-being of diplomatic and consular
personnel and premises in Kuwait and in Iraq and take no action to hinder the diplomatic and consular missions
in the performance of their functions, including access to their nationals and the protection of their person and
interests ....
27. Scheffer, The United Nations in the Gulf, supra note 9, at 4-5.
28. U.N. CHARTER art. 50:
If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether
a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from
the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of
those problems.
29. Scheffer, The United Nations in the Gulf, supra note 9, at 5.
30. N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1990, at AI0, col. 1. Apart from reaffirming all of the past resolu-
tions, Security Council Resolution 670 provided, in part:
2. CONFIRMS that Resolution 661 (1990) applies to all means of transport, including aircraft;
3. DECIDES that all states, notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations conferred or imposed by any
international agreement or any contract entered into or any license or permit granted before the date of the present
resolution, shall deny permission to any aircraft to take off from their territory if the aircraft would carry any cargo
to or from Iraq or Kuwait other than food in humanitarian circumstances, subject to authorization by the Council
or the Committee established by Resolution 661 (1990) and in accordance with Resolution 666 (1990), or supplies
intended strictly for medical purposes or solely for UNIIMOG;
5. DECIDES that each state shall take all necessary measures to insure that any aircraft registered in its territory
or operated by an operator who has his principal place of business or permanent residence in its territory complies
with the provisions of Resolution 661 (1990) and the present resolution; ....
31. N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1990, at A 10, col. 1. For states violating the resolution, the resolution
provided: "12.
DECIDES to consider, in the event of evasion of the provisions of Resolution 661 (1990) or of the present
resolution by a state or its nationals or through its territory, measures directed at the state in question to prevent
such evasion .... "
32. L.A. Times, Oct. 30, 1990, at B6, col. 6.
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Iraq aware of its future liabilities, Resolution 674 also called for the gathering of
information on Iraq's human rights abuses in Kuwait.
33
Finally, in the latter days of November 1990, the Security Council passed two
resolutions, the second of which could change the course of world unity. On
November 28, 1990, the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 677.34
The Security Council aimed this resolution primarily at Iraq's attempts to drive
Kuwaiti citizens out of their country.
35
The following day, November 29, 1990, pursuant to Chapter VII, the Security
Council passed Resolution 678. This action represented only the second time in
the history of the United Nations that the Security Council had authorized the use
of military force. 36 Despite the United States Secretary of State's pronouncement
that, "We have a chance to make this Security Council and the United Nations
true institutions for peace and justice around the globe," the vote was not unan-
imous. 37 Cuba and Yemen voted against Resolution 678, while China ab-
stained.38 The resolution gave Iraq until January 15, 1991, to comply with all
previous U.N. resolutions concerning the invasion of Kuwait. 39 The resolution,
however, did not require an attack immediately following the January 15 dead-
line. Resolution 678 simply set January 15, 1991, as the day after which military
33. N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1990, at A12, col. 4. While reaffirming past resolutions, Security
Council Resolution 674 also provided, in part:
1. DEMANDS that the Iraqi authorities and occupying forces immediately cease and desist from taking third-state
nationals hostage, and mistreating and oppressing Kuwaiti and third-state nationals, and from any other actions
such as those reported to the Council and described above, violating the decisions of this Council, the Charter of
the United Nations, the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations
and international law;
2. INVITES states to collate substantiated information in their possession or submitted to them on the grave
breaches by Iraq as per paragraph I above and to make this information available to the Council;
8. REMINDS Iraq that under international law it is liable for any loss, damage or injury arising in regard to Kuwait
and third states, and their nationals and corporations, as a result of the invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait
by Iraq;
9. INVITES states to collect relevant information regarding their claims, and those of their nationals and corpo-
rations, for restitution or financial compensation by Iraq with a view to such arrangements as may be established
in accordance with international law; ....
34. L.A. Times, Jan. 15, 1991, at H7, col. 2.
35. Id. at H7. The Security Council voted 15 to 0 to condemn Iraq's alleged attempts to drive
out Kuwaitis and repopulate their country, and it requested the U.N. Secretary-General to take
possession of Kuwait's census and citizenship records for safekeeping.
36. L.A. Times, Nov. 30, 1990, at Al, col. 6. The last time the Security Council sanctioned the
use of force against a nation was in June 1950, when the Security Council, in the absence of the
boycotting Soviet Union, authorized the use of force against North Korea.
37. Id. at Al.
38. Id.
39. Id. Security Council Resolution 678 provided:
1. DEMANDS that Iraq comply fully with resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions
and decides, while maintaining all its decisions, to allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of goodwill, to do
so;
2. AUTHORIZES member states cooperating with the government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 Jan.
1991 fully implements, as set forth in Paragraph I above, the foregoing resolutions, to use all necessary means to
uphold and implement Security Council resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to
restore international peace and security in the area;
3. REQUESTS all states to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken in pursuance of Paragraph 2 of
this resolution;
4. REQUESTS the states concerned to keep the council regularly informed on the progress of actions undertaken
pursuant to Paragraphs 2 and 3 of this resolution;
5. DECIDES to remain seized of the matter.
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action was justified. 40 The drafting and passing of Resolution 678 in reliance on
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, rather than relying solely on article 51, re-
flected wisdom on behalf of the United States and the other supporting nations.
B. THE U.S. RESPONSE
Although the Security Council enacted seven of the resolutions pursuant to
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, none of the resolutions referred specifically to
article 51, which is contained in Chapter VII. 4 1 Nevertheless, just as the United
Nations was swift in its response to the Iraqi invasion, so too was the United
States in its response. The United States, however, relied mainly on article 51,
the broad self-defense and collective security provision, in justifying both en-
forcement of the economic trade embargo and the sending of forces to Saudi
Arabia.42
On the day Iraq invaded Kuwait, and four days prior to the official U.N. trade
embargo enacted on August 6, 1990, President Bush issued two executive or-
ders. 43 The first order imposed an asset freeze and trade embargo against Iraq,
while the second called for a blocking of transfers of official Kuwaiti assets in the
United States to protect them from Iraqi takeover.4 Individuals familiar with
international law and the use of trade embargoes are well aware that economic
sanctions and trade embargoes against another state are meaningless unless the
sanctioning country provides for enforcement and unity among other nations in
sanctioning the aggressor state.45
After the United Nations enacted Resolution 661, the trade embargo resolu-
tion, and the United States imposed its own economic sanctions, the Bush
administration immediately referred to article 51 for assistance. On August 12,
1990, the United States Secretary of State stated that pursuant to the Emir of
Kuwait's request for aid in the situation, the United States would commence
40. Id.
41. See generally supra notes 17, 21, 23, 24, 25, 29, 39. The Security Council passed Reso-
lutions 661, 664, 665, 666, 667, 670, and 678 pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
42. U.N. CHARTER art 51:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and respon-
sibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in
order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
43. Bacon, U.S. Asset Freeze, Trade Embargo Likely to Do Little Harm to Iraq, Wall St. J.,
Aug. 3, 1990, at A5, col. 4.
44. Id. Although this combination of sanctions was the most severe combination that the United
States could impose on Iraq, the fact that the United States had a limited business presence in Iraq
reduced the impact of these sanctions on Iraq. The House of Representatives voted 416-0 to authorize
the embargo on practically all trade with Iraq.
45. Mayall, The Sanctions Problem in International Economic Relations: Reflections in the Light
of Recent Experience, 60 INr'L A . 631 (1984). Mayall commented that, generally, economic
sanctions do not work. This is usually a result of an inability among sanctioning nations to enforce
the sanctions uniformly.
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interdicting ships attempting to do business with Iraq.46 In interpreting article 51
the Secretary of State contended that, provided the legitimate government of
Kuwait requested assistance from the United States, the legal authority existed to
impose an embargo or a blockade.47 Throughout the discussion of authorization
for and enforcement of the embargo, U.S. officials were careful to refer to the
intercepting of ships as an "interdiction" rather than a blockade.48 Proponents
of international law consider an official blockade to be an act of War.4 9 As of
August 14, 1990, the United States maintained nine warships in the Persian Gulf
and an aircraft carrier and five supporting ships in the Red Sea awaiting orders
to enforce the sanctions.
50
Prior to the Security Council's imposition of Resolution 665 on August 25,
1990, providing for enforcement of the trade sanctions, the U.S. interdiction
actions and reliance on article 51 created controversy within the United Na-
tions. 5 1 According to British sources, some members of the Security Council
questioned whether the United States was overreaching in its enforcement of the
interdiction because Resolution 661 did not authorize the use of military force to
enforce the resolution.52 The Bush administration apparently responded to the
reported criticism by admitting that Resolution 661 provided no independent
legal basis for maritime interdiction, but that article 51 provided adequate legal
justification for self-defense. 53 The Secretary-General of the United Nations,
however, spoke more strongly on the subject when he stated that any unilateral
action by United States warships in the Persian Gulf to enforce the trade sanc-
tions against Iraq would constitute a breach of the U.N. Charter.54 As noted,
however, the Security Council under Resolution 665 provided the legal authority
required to enforce the trade sanctions on August 25, 1990. 55 By September 27,
46. Wash. Post, Aug. 13, 1990, at AI8, col. 1.
47. Riddell, Crisis in the Gulf: U.S. Claims Power to Intercept Tankers, Fin. Times, Aug. 13,
1990, at 2. Upon receiving a formal request from the legitimate government of Kuwait, Secretary
Baker announced that the U.S. had the authority under article 51 to intercept ships. Gerstenzang,
U.S. Buoyed by Impact of Economic Embargo, L.A. Times, Aug. 14, 1990, at Al, col. 3. An
administration official stated that the United States had the legal authority under article 51 because
the ousted emir of Kuwait had requested military assistance in enforcing the embargo.
48. Riddell, Crisis in the Gulf: U.S. Claims Power to Intercept Tankers, Fin. Times, Aug. 13,
1990, at 12.
49. See generally Negin, The Case for Legitimate Interdiction of Commerce During Peacetime,
10 GEO. MASON U.L. REV. 191, 194-95 (1987).
50. Tumulty, U.S. Speaks Softly on Interdiction, L.A. Times, Aug. 14, 1990, at A6, col. 4.
51. Gerstenzang, supra note 47, at Al, col. 3.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Lewis, U.N. Chief Argues Blockade Is Hasty, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1990, at A12, col. 1.
The Secretary-General stated that "[a]ny intervention, whatever the country, would not be in accor-
dance with either the letter or the spirit of the United Nations Charter." When asked if the U.S. use
of military force to enforce economic sanctions would present a violation of international law, he
responded that it "would depend on whether the action taken by the American Government had been
approved by the Security Council."
55. See Security Council Regulation 665, supra note 23, at para. 1.
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1990, maritime forces in the Persian Gulf had interdicted over 1,000 vessels.56
The question remained whether article 51 alone, invoked unilaterally by the
United States and other countries, provided sufficient justification for the en-
forcement of the economic sanctions according to international law.
The U.S. military reaction to the Iraqi invasion proved to be as swift as the
economic reaction. Once the Iraqis overran Kuwait, the fear arose that Hussein
had targeted Saudi Arabia as his next victim. 57 This fear heightened when King
Fahd of Saudi Arabia, along with President Ozal of Turkey, agreed to terminate
the flow of Iraqi oil while Iraqi troops moved towards the Saudi border.58 King
Fahd agreed not only to stop the flow of Iraqi oil, but also to increase the amount
of Saudi oil shipped to the western world. 59 The United States desired to protect
Saudi Arabia, but in order to justify the assistance under the auspices of collec-
tive self-defense, King Fahd had to request the protection just as had the Emir of
Kuwait. 6° After the request by Saudi Arabia, other Arabian Gulf states entered
into agreements with the United States providing for the deployment of U.S.
troops in their countries.6I
Immediately after the request for military aid, the United States began to
deploy troops to Saudi Arabian bases, which although built by the U.S., had
never been inhabited by U.S. troops. 6 2 In the early stages of the military build-
up, President Bush was careful to emphasize to citizens of the United States, as
well as to other world leaders, that the recently deployed armed forces were in
the region only for deterrent and defensive purposes. 63 According to estimates,
six days after the United States instituted "Operation Desert Shield," the name
given to the military deployment in Saudi Arabia, 10,000 American troops had
taken their positions in the region. 64 Regardless of Hussein's original intentions
with regard to Saudi Arabia, the British-supported U.S. reaction to King Fahd's
request virtually eliminated Iraq's possibilities for an immediate invasion
56. Scheffer, The United Nations in the Gulf, supra note 9, at 12. As of September 27, 1990,
the interdiction operation had intercepted 1,400 ships to question them as to their cargo and desti-
nation. The U.S. Navy had boarded 110 of the over 125 vessels that had been boarded and searched.
U.S. ships fired shots across the bow of three vessels while an Australian ship fired across the bow
of another vessel. At that time, the interdiction of ships prevented six vessels from proceeding to their
destination.
57. THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 11, 1990, at 17.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. The United States Secretary of Defense and King Fahd met, and the leader of Saudi
Arabia immediately requested American assistance.
61. Scheffer, The United Nations in the Gulf, supra note 9, at 6. After the Saudi request, the
United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, and Qatar entered into agreements with the United States
allowing the deployment of American armed forces in their countries.
62. THE ECONOMIST, supra note 57, at 17.
63. Id.
64. Gerstenzang, supra note 47, at Al, col. 3. According to one U.S. soldier, officers were
instructing them at the time to prepare for a stay in Saudi Arabia of four to six months.
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of Saudi Arabia.65 As of October 10, 1990, according to the United States
Secretary of State, twenty nations had sent forces to assist in Operation Desert
Shield. 66 By October 1990, the United States, Great Britain, and France main-
tained the largest deployments of armed forces in the region, with the total
number of U.S. troops surpassing 200,000.67 As of the invasion of Iraq on
January 17, 1991, twenty-eight nations had contributed to the military build-up
against Iraq. 68 Estimates indicated that by January 15, 1991, the number of
forces massed in the Persian Gulf region included 430,000 U.S. forces and
245,000 allied forces against 605,000 Iraqi forces.69
Throughout the deployment of armed forces to the Persian Gulf region, the
United States justified its actions just as it had justified them in the enforcement
of economic sanctions prior to the Security Council imposition of Resolution
665. Since the United States had no defense treaties with Persian Gulf nations,
it relied on the inherent right of collective self-defense and the right of collective
self-defense offered under article 51 .70 According to public international law, the
inherent right of collective self-defense is considered a customary right that can
be invoked in the event a state suffers military attack and subsequently requests
military support from another state. 7 1 Initially, the United States and Great
Britain contended that article 51 provided the legal authority to deploy troops to
the Gulf region and the authority to attack Iraq in defense of Kuwait. 72 Although
article 51 justified the initial U.S. intervention in the Iraq-Kuwait situation, it
was not clear whether the same article justified an attack on Iraq. The Security
Council's passage of Resolution 678 relieved the United States of this volatile
question, and provided the United States and other member states with sufficient
authorization to attack Iraq.
II. United States' Use of Article 51
in Other International Situations
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter is incorporated into international law more by
reference than by action. The most frequent use of article 51, either explicitly or
inferentially, is in treaties between nations providing for collective self-
65. THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 18, 1990, at 33, col. 2. The United States received apparent approval
from many Islamic countries through the provision of armed units by Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan, and
Syria.
66. The Persian Gulf Crisis: Hearing Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (statement of Secretary of State James Baker 1II).
67. Scheffer, In the U.N. Charter, supra note 5, at 4, col. 1.
68. Wall St. J., Jan. 17, 1991, at 1.
69. Van Voorst, Advantage: the Alliance, TIME, Jan. 21, 1991, at 34.
70. Scheffer, The United Nations in the Gulf, supra note 9, at 6.
71. Id.; see also L. GOODRICH, supra note 13, at 344.
72. Curtius, U.S. Announces Baker Will Fly to Saudi Arabia Next Month, Boston Globe, Oct.
27, 1990, at 6; Lewis, Iraq Standing Firm, Soviets Tell U.N., N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1990, at A 1l,
col. 4.
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defense. 73 The NATO Treaty interprets article 51 broadly and authorizes military
action by any member nation when another member of the agreement suffers
attack. 74 The Warsaw Treaty contained similar provisions before its formal ab-
rogation at a meeting of the Warsaw Pact nations on February 25, 1991, at
Budapest, Hungary.
75
While the United States did not invoke article 51 in support of the police
action in Korea, the United States and other countries referred to the provision
on a number of occasions in connection with that conflict.76 More recently, the
situations that have led the United States to invoke article 51 have been within the
Western Hemisphere. 77 In these instances the United States has relied not only on
article 51 to justify intervention, but on other arguments as well. 7 8 This section
73. L. GOODRICH, supra note 13, at 349-50. The following treaties have been signed in accor-
dance with article 51: the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of Sept. 2, 1947, which
was signed by the twenty-one American republics, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 21 U.N.T.S.
77; the Brussels Treaty of Mar. 17, 1948, to which Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
and the United Kingdom were signatories, 19 U.N.T.S. 51, and to which the Federal Republic of
Germany and Italy became parties on Oct. 23, 1954, 211 U.N.T.S. 342; the North Atlantic Treaty
of Apr. 4, 1949, which fifteen nations bordering on the Atlantic and the Mediterranean joined, 63
Stat. 2241, T.I.A.S. No. 1964, 34 U.N.T.S. 243; the Mutual Defense Treaty of Aug. 30, 1951,
between the U.S. and the Philippines, 3 U.S.T. 3947, T.I.A.S. No. 2529, 177 U.N.T.S. 133; the
Security Treaty of Sept. 1, 1951, among Australia, New Zealand, and the U.S., 3 U.S.T. 3420,
T.I.A.S. No. 2493, 131 U.N.T.S. 83; the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the
U.S. and Japan, 11 U.S.T. 1632, T.I.A.S. No. 3409, 373 U.N.T.S. 179; the Mutual Defense Treaty
of Oct. 1, 1953, between the U.S. and [South] Korea, 5 U.S.T. 2368, T.I.A.S. No. 3097, 238
U.N.T.S. 199; the Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S. and the Republic of China of Dec. 2,
1954, 6 U.S.T. 433, T.I.A.S. No. 3178, 248 U.N.T.S. 213; the South-East Asia Collective Defense
Treaty of Sept. 8, 1954, to which the U.S., the United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand,
the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan are parties, 6 U.S.T. 81, T.I.A.S. No. 3170, 209 U.N.T.S.
28; the Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty among the States of the Arab League of June
17, 1950; and the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (the Warsaw Pact) of
May 14, 1955, 219 U.N.T.S. 24.
74. Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1620, 1639 (1984)
[hereinafter Schachter, The Right of States]. Schachter pointed out that some states, from time to
time, provided assistance to a government that was under attack from external forces although there
was no existing treaty between the countries. "In such cases (which have been rare)," Schachter
observed, "the two states have had political and strategic links as well as a common perception that
the attacking state was a threat to both." Presumably, the U.S. argument was that the attack on
Kuwait created a threat to the United States because of the possibility of an attack on Saudi Arabia
and ultimately a cutting off by Hussein of a large percentage of the world's oil supply.
75. Id.; Harden, Warsaw Pact Disbands Military Union, Washington Post, Feb. 26, 1991, at
A16, col. 1.
76. L. GOODRICH, supra note 13, at 349. The United States did not invoke the specific provisions
of article 51 as a justification for the military measures instituted in support of the Republic of Korea.
Rather, the Security Council resolution signed on June 27, 1950, authorizing the military action in
Korea, referred to the general principles and purposes of the U.N. Charter. Article 51 and the right
of collective self-defense, however, were mentioned in the debate preceding the signing of the
resolution.
77. Dore, The United States, Self-Defense and the U.N. Charter: A Comment on Principle and
Expediency in Legal Reasoning, 24 STAN. J. INT'L L. (1987).
78. Id. at 1. The justifications the United States has utilized in Western Hemisphere interventions
on the basis of self-defense include: (1) a global or universal doctrine, based on the U.N. Charter;
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provides an overview of U.S. actions in reliance upon article 51 in Guatemala,
Nicaragua, and Libya, and analyzes them in reference to the Iraq-Kuwait con-
flict.
A. GUATEMALA
The United States relied on article 51, as well as on article 52, in 1954 when
a United States-supported army invaded Guatemala to overthrow the leftist gov-
ernment of President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman. 79 Article 52 of the U.N. Charter
provides for the solving of international conflicts through regional arrange-
ments. 80 The United States attempted to use the provisions simultaneously to
advance the primary goal of the Organization of American States (OAS): to
prevent interference in Western Hemisphere affairs by the international Commu-
nist movement.
81
Regional arrangements obviously are encouraged by the United Nations. In
justifying the invasion of Guatemala, however, the United States argued that the
OAS regional arrangement took precedence over the requirements of article 51.82
In essence, the United States proposed that it could take any self-defense mea-
sures against Guatemala as long as they did not conflict with article 52.83 The
U.S. view was that the leftist government was violating the provisions of the
OAS; therefore, the OAS had primary authority over the dispute according to
article 52.84
Regardless of the regional arrangement, the Security Council maintained in-
dependent jurisdiction over the conflict under article 51.85 The language of this
provision suggests a primacy over regional arrangements. It requires that any
action of self-defense shall not undermine the authority of the Security Council
to take appropriate actions to maintain or restore international peace and secu-
(2) a regional doctrine, also based on the charter; (3) a regional doctrine based on custom or regional
treaty, and external to the charter; (4) a regional doctrine based on a regional treaty to which the
invoking state was a party; (5) a regional doctrine based on a regional treaty to which the state
invoking it was not a party; (6) a doctrine founded alternatively or independently on customary
international law.
79. Id. at 4.
80. U.N. CHARTER art 52, paras. 1-3:
1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such
matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action,
provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of
the United Nations.
2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make
every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional
agencies before referring them to the Security Council.
3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such
regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference
from the Security Council.
81. Dore, supra note 77, at 4.
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rity.86 The United States, therefore, was under a duty according to article 51 to
maintain actions of self-defense against Guatemala only until the Security Coun-
cil acted. Ultimately, the Security Council in a vote of four to five, with two
abstentions, refused to place the question of U.S. actions in Guatemala on its
agenda.87 The main argument for the refusal to act was that the OAS was
reviewing the situation. 
88
Although the Security Council allowed the OAS to consider the matter on its
own, the Guatemalan incident is relevant to the Iraq-Kuwait situation because it
reflects the limits inherent in article 51. The provision, while providing for a
self-defense mechanism, and purportedly maintaining primacy over regional
arrangements, places limits on itself. Self-defense under article 51 extends only
to the commencement of action by the Security Council. 89 In the Guatemalan
situation, the Security Council deferred to the OAS. However, in the Iraq-Kuwait
situation no regional arrangement existed. The United States wisely proceeded
with article 51 only as far as its language allowed and subsequently deferred to
the Security Council, because, unlike in Guatemala, the Security Council was
willing to act.
B. NICARAGUA
The United States resorted again to an article 51 collective self-defense argu-
ment to justify its actions in support of El Salvador and the Nicaraguan coun-
terrevolutionaries (the contras) against the Sandinista government of Nicara-
gua. 90 United States' military support for the contras involved training, arming,
equipping, financing, and supplying the contra forces, as well as encouraging,
supporting, and aiding military and paramilitary actions against Nicaragua. 91
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) held the United States responsible for the
mining of Nicaraguan waters as well as seven specified attacks in Nicaragua. 92
Supporters of the U.S. actions against Nicaragua rationalized these actions,
generally, through reliance on article 51.
86. Id. at 5-6.
87. L. GOODRICH, supra note 13, at 361.
88. Id.
89. Kunz, Sanctions in International Law, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 324, 333 (1960).
90. See generally Moore, The Secret War in Central America and the Future of World Order, 80
AM. J. INT'L L. 43 (1986).
91. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
14, 14, 123 (para. 238), 146-47 (para. 292(4)) (Judgment of June 25, 1986), reprinted in 25 I.L.M.
1023 (1986).
92. Id. at 123 (para. 238), 146-47 (para. 292(4), and (6)).
93. Rowles, "Secret Wars," Self-Defense and the Charter-A Reply to Professor Moore, 80 AM.
J. INT'L L. 568, 569 (1986). Rowles maintained that the three basic tenets on which Professor Moore
relied in his article, The Secret War in Central America and the Future of World Order, supra note
90, to support the U.S. operations in Nicaragua were: (1) that the arms shipments and other assis-
tance provided by the Nicaraguan government to the guerrillas in El Salvador constituted an "armed
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The U.S. dependence on article 51 in regard to its actions in Nicaragua raised
several questions for the United States and for international law in general. First,
it was not clear that U.S. reliance on article 51 was completely justified.
One commentator contended that the justifications for United States support in
Nicaragua carried little weight under article 51.9 He stated that evidence of an
armed attack by Nicaragua according to the requirements of article 51 was
suspect.95 In addition, use of article 51 may have been unlawful under interna-
tional law because El Salvador failed to make any public references to a proper
request for assistance until April 1984.96 With regard to the U.S. claim that it had
met all of the lawful requirements of article 51, the same commentator argued
that the U.S. assistance was neither proportional to the threat presented, as
article 51 required, nor had the United States immediately notified the Security
Council of measures taken in collective self-defense of El Salvador, as article 51
also required.97
Ultimately, the ICJ agreed with this analysis of U.S. intervention in support of
the contras. In its decision the ICJ held that the Nicaraguan actions against El
attack" according to the meaning of that phrase in article 51 of the U.N. Charter; (2) that the U.S.
support of the Nicaraguan contras and the other military and paramilitary measures taken against
Nicaragua were justified under the right of collective self-defense in article 51 in response to a request
for such assistance from El Salvador; and (3) that the U.S. actions against Nicaragua satisfied the
remaining requirements for the lawful exercise of collective self-defense, including the requirement
of proportionality.
94. See Rowles, supra note 93, at 568.
95. Id. at 569-70. Rowles based this conclusion on evidence of diminishing arms shipments into
El Salvador from Nicaragua. He also argued that no persuasive evidence existed to suggest the
Nicaraguan government directed and controlled the guerilla operations in El Salvador. Although
Nicaragua had shipped arms into El Salvador from 1980-81, Rowles suggested that while this was
a violation of international law, it was not an armed attack within the meaning of article 51 and did
not constitute a military response under that provision. According to the commentator, the appro-
priate reaction should have been a request for collective action under the Rio Treaty, a request for
action by the Security Council, or a petition to the International Court of Justice.
96. Id. at 572-74. In its statement to the ICJ on Aug. 15, 1984 in support of the United States,
El Salvador stated:
It is our natural, inherent right under article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations to have recourse to individual
and collective acts of self-defense. It was with this in mind that President Duarte, during a recent visit to the United
States and in discussions with U.S. Congressmen, reiterated the importance of this assistance for our defense from
the U.S. and the democratic nations of the world.
Rowles questioned the exact date on which a Salvadoran request for assistance was made because of
the absence of a public reference to it until April 1984. The failure to point to an exact date suggests
to Rowles that El Salvador never made such a request. In the event El Salvador failed to make a formal
request for assistance, the U.S. actions prior to April 1984 could not be justified under article 51.
97. Id. at 574-77. With regard to the lack of proportionality to the Nicaraguan threat, Rowles
stated that the contras' military maneuvers were not limited to actions related directly to the objective
of halting shipments of arms, ammunition, and other material to El Salvador. The U.S. assistance to
the contras was not intended merely to terminate the Nicaraguan support of the guerrillas in El
Salvador, but to remove the structure of the Sandinista Government of Nicaragua. Such an intention,
according to Rowles, did not reflect the goals of collective self-defense under article 51. In terms of
the failure of the United States in reporting its military assistance to the Security Council, the
justification that such a requirement in a covert situation was unnecessary, according to Rowles,
proceeded entirely against the goal of allowing the Security Council to maintain international peace
and security.
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Salvador did not constitute armed attacks, and more importantly, that while El
Salvador could institute proportionate countermeasures against Nicaragua, a
third state could not take such action.
98
The United States may have acted cautiously in the Iraq-Kuwait situation in
light of the Nicaragua case. First, the ICJ disagreed with the U.S. rationale of
collective self-defense under article 51; second, the United States withdrew from
the jurisdiction of the ICJ claiming that the Security Council maintained an
exclusive right in authorizing collective self-defense. 99 This argument that the
Security Council possessed an independent authority to control situations involv-
ing article 51 contradicted the regional primacy argument the United States
asserted in the Guatemalan situation. Nevertheless, the United States argued that
the ICJ did not have jurisdiction over the dispute because the Security Council
maintained an exclusive right to determine the legality of a self-defense measure
invoked under article 51.00
Although the United States apparently attempted this exclusivity argument to
avoid the jurisdiction of the ICJ, its ramifications would have been detrimental to the
U.S. action in Saudi Arabia had the United States ultimately relied on article 51:
Strong grounds exist for construing the Security Council's independent authority to take
action under article 51 as the necessary and logical complement to the Council's
exclusive competence to declare a measure illegal. It would be incongruous for the
Security Council to have exclusive competence to pronounce a particular self-defense
measure illegal without possessing the power to take remedial action.' 1O
If, as the United States argued in the Nicaragua case, the Security Council
maintained this exclusive authority, the Council could have prevented the United
States from taking aggressive action against Iraq under article 51, or it could
have declared such an action illegal in light of the language of the provision. This
quagmire created by the U.S. jurisdictional argument to the ICJ in Nicaragua, as
well as the court's holding that the United States actions in reliance on article 51
were inappropriate, strengthen the argument that the U.S. correctly distanced
itself from this provision before taking offensive action against Iraq.
98. Hargrove, The Nicaragua Judgment and the Future of the Law of Force and Self-Defense,
81 AM. J. INT'L L. 135, 137-38 (1987) (citing Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 86 (para. 160) 110-11 (para. 211), 127, (para. 249)
(Judgement of June 25, 1986). The court held that the providing of arms or other support to military
forces operating in another state did not constitute an armed attack. Nevertheless, the flow of arms
from Nicaragua to El Salvador was not attributable to the Government of Nicaragua. The court also
held that, although the supply of arms to armed forces in another nation's territory could amount to
an unlawful use of force, the use of proportionate countermeasures in self-defense could be taken
only by the victim state itself, and not by a third state, such as the United States acting in collective
self-defense.
99. Dore, supra note 77, at 15.
100. Id. at 16. Dore noted that the United States argued that the Security Council's authority was
total and exclusive, so that any judicial examination of a self-defense claim in an ongoing conflict
would be a "per se impairment" of the self-defense right.
101. Id. at 17.
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C. LIBYA
The final situation to be examined in which the United States referred to article
51 to sustain an action against another state involved the nation of Libya and its
leader, Colonel Muammar el Qadhafi. On April 15, 1986, U.S. Air Force and
Navy aircraft attacked prearranged targets inside the borders of Libya.' 0 2 U.S.
officials rationalized the bombings in light of recent Libyan terrorist activities in
which Americans had died. ' 0 3 Although the recent aggressive actions were cited
as the justification, they were merely a culmination of multiple Qadhafi actions
represented by his statement: "We have the fight to fight America, and we have
the fight to export terrorism to them."'°4
The first Libyan action to cause outrage was the simultaneous bombing of airline
offices in Rome and Vienna on December 27, 1985.'05 After ordering no Amer-
icans to conduct business in Libya without a license, President Reagan severed
economic ties with Libya and imposed economic sanctions against the nation.' 06
On March 24, 1986, during an announced U.S. naval exercise in the Gulf of Sidra,
Libyan forces fired six missiles at U.S. planes navigating more than twelve miles
from the Libyan coast. ' 07 The event that ultimately provoked the air strike was the
explosion of a bomb in a West German discotheque. 108 Although Qadhafi denied
involvement in the bombing, Reagan administration officials stated that incon-
trovertible evidence existed that pointed to Libya's involvement.'
0 9
The United States claimed that its attack on Libya was based on self-
defense." 0 In the United Nations, however, reaction to the bombing of Libya
was overwhelmingly against the United States."' Several countries sponsored a
Security Council resolution that would have condemned the attack as a violation
of the U.N. Charter. 12 The United States, Great Britain, and France, however,
102. Intoccia, American Bombing of Libya: An International Legal Analysis, 19 CASE W. RS. J.
INT'L L. 177, 179 (1987). In less than one-half hour, the U.S. aircraft attacked the following targets:
the Tripoli Military Air Field, Tarabulus Barracks, Sidi Balal Training Camp, the Benina Military Air
Field, and Benghazi Military Barracks. According to Libyan officials, thirty-seven people were
killed, including Qadhafi's stepdaughter, and ninety-three people were injured, including two of
Qadhafi's sons. Qadhafi escaped the aerial strike unharmed.
103. Id. at 190.
104. Id. at 182.
105. Id. at 182. In these two bombings, twenty people died, including five Americans, and over
eighty people were injured.
106. N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1986, at Al, col. 6.
107. id. Mar. 25, 1986, at Al, col. 6.
108. Intoccia, supra note 102, at 185. The explosion immediately killed three persons, including
two American servicemen, and injured 154 persons, of whom almost 60 were Americans.
109. N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1986, at Al, col. 6.
110. Intoccia, supra note 102, at 190. President Reagan argued that "[w]hen our citizens are
abused or attacked anywhere in the world, on the direct orders of a hostile regime, we will respond.
... Self-defense is not only our right, it is our duty."
11l. Id. at 189.
112. Id.
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vetoed the resolution. 113 One published analysis argued that because the United
States attempted to enforce peaceful measures, such as economic sanctions, prior
to the raid, limited its armed response so as to repel only an immediate threat,
and intended to protect American citizens, it acted lawfully under international
law. i1 4 Unlike the Guatemalan and Nicaraguan situations, the United States
acted not in accordance with collective self-defense, but out of a direct self-
defense concern for its own citizens.
Despite such a persuasive argument, the Libyan bombing created an uproar in
the international community. Some of the United States' closest allies refused to
condone the bombing of Libya, regardless of the U.S. arguments in favor of the
action. 15 This uproar reflected the limitations that the international community
placed upon the power of article 51.
The Guatemalan, Nicaraguan, and Libyan situations may have awakened the
Bush administration to the fact that, when applied, article 51 is limited by its
own principles. In each of these cases, the United States interpreted article 51
in a manner beneficial to that particular circumstance. Other countries were
quick to question the implementation of article 51. Even in the Libyan instance,
in which the United States argued that it acted to protect the lives of American
citizens abroad, other members of the United Nations strongly criticized the
United States for its actions and reliance on article 51 in support of those
actions. 116 In light of the critical analysis that nations impose on the use of
article 51, the Security Council's reliance on Chapter VII as the basis for
Resolution 678 relieved the United States from the difficult task of defending an
aggressive use of article 51.
III. Aggression Against Iraq: International
Law Requires More than Article 51
The U.N. Charter is based on the principle that member states shall not use
military force against other nations. 117 The drafters of the U.N. Charter orga-
113. Id. The countries that sponsored the resolution were the Congo, Ghana, Madagascar, Trin-
idad and Tobago, and the United Arab Emirates. Voting in favor of the resolution were Bulgaria,
China, the Soviet Union, and Thailand. The General Assembly, however, successfully passed a
resolution condemning the U.S. bombing.
114. Id. at 213.
115. Doxey, International Sanctions in Recent State Practice: Trends and Problems, in CONTEM-
PORARY PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF GEORGE SCHWARZENBERGER ON His
EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY 64 (B. Cheng & E.D. Brown eds. 1988). After the Libyan bombing, only Great
Britain and Canada approved the bombing raid on Libya. France not only refused to approve the
action, it refused overflight permission for U.S. aircraft proceeding from bases in Great Britain to the
Libyan targets.
116. Intoccia, supra note 102, at 189.
117. L. GOODRICH, supra note 13, at 44-45.
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nized and expressed this principle in article 2(4). 118 In its pursuit of international
peace, the United Nations historically has interpreted this provision broadly to ensure
the members' awareness that it does not condone the use of military force." 
9
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, however, presents several options to nations
in the event the use of force is necessary and unavoidable. Article 51 incorpo-
rates one of those options.' 20 As noted, however, the drafters built into this
provision both explicit and implicit limitations, including the requirement of
necessity, proportionality, and the authority to act only "until the Security Coun-
cil has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and secu-
rity.' 2' Nations, however, repeatedly have attempted to expand the concept of
self-defense so as to allow a controversial use of force. ' 22 While article 51 might
have supported an offensive counterattack on Iraq in early August, by mid-
October that option no longer existed. 123 Prior to the passage of Resolution 678
118. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 states that "[aill Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."
119. L. GOODRICH, supra note 13, at 47-48. In 1963, a special committee of the General
Assembly considering the meaning of article 2(4) made the following determinations with respect to
the provision in the Report of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States:
(a) Wars of aggression constitute international crimes against peace.
(b) Every state has the duty to refrain from organizing or encouraging the organization of irregular or volunteer
forces or armed bands within its territory or any other territory for incursions into the territory of another State.
(c) Every State has the duty to refrain from instigating, assisting or organizing civil strife or committing terrorist
acts in another State, or from conniving at or acquiescing in organized activities directed towards such ends, when
such acts involve a threat or use of force.
(d) Every State has the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force to violate the existing boundaries of another
State, or as a means of solving its international disputes, including territorial disputes and problems concerning
frontiers between States.
120. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (quoted supra note 42).
121. Id. Wallace, International Law and the Use of Force: Reflections on the Need for Reform, 19
INT'L LAW. 259, 262 (1985). Wallace noted that the basic premise in support of the use of force
through international law mechanisms was that force was to be used as late as possible and as little
as possible. In a sense, this observation has strong merit because the U.N. Charter is reluctant to
allow nations to use military force.
122. Schachter, Self-Defense and the Rule of Law, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 259, 271 (1989) [hereinafter
Schachter, Self-Defense and the Rule of Law]. Schachter noted that nations have claimed a right to
use force under the auspices of self-defense, not necessarily article 51, in a number of situations
including: (1) the use of force to rescue political hostages; (2) the use of force against officials or
armed bases in a foreign state believed to be supporting terrorists acts; (3) the use of force against
troops, planes, ships, or armed bases believed to be threatening imminent attack; (4) the use of
retaliatory force against a force in order to deter further attacks; (5) the use of force against a
government that has provided arms or technical support to revolutionaries in a third state; (6) the use
of force against a government that has allowed the military force of a third state to use its territory;
and (7) the use of force in the name of collective self-defense against a government established by
foreign forces but faced with popular resistance.
123. Scheffer, In the U.N. Charter, supra note 5, at 4, col. 3. By not reacting immediately, the
United States lost the opportunity to rely on article 51 and the concept of immediate self-defense.
Scheffer further pointed out that without additional provocation by Iraq, a U.S. attack on that nation,
without Security Council authorization, would have rendered the Security Council resolutions es-
sentially pointless in their attempt to overcome Hussein's aggression through peaceful collective
security measures.
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at the end of November 1990, however, the Bush administration did not consider
the magnitude of the limitations on article 51, as reflected by the numerous
statements that the United States maintained the legal authority to attack Iraq
unilaterally. 124
A. PROPORTIONALITY
Although the language of article 51 does not explicitly include the requirement
of proportionality, the United Nations has determined it to be an implicit element
of the provision, with well-understood limits. 125 Any act of individual self-
defense or collective security must not exceed the level of force that the invading
country has implemented against the reacting state. 126 The actions employed in
self-defense must not exceed either the manner or the aim of the actions that have
caused provocation. 127 Not only must the reaction be necessary, as discussed
below, but it must be proportional to the aggressive action in its extent, manner,
and goal. 128 The basic idea behind the proportionality requirement is that a
nation, whether individually or collectively, may use the self-defense mechanism
only "to the extent necessary" to counteract the offensive action taken against
the state. 129 Numerous examples of counterinterventions have occurred during
recent times that international law considered disproportionate. 1
30
According to the doctrine of proportionality, a limited U.S. reaction against
Iraq under article 51 could have withstood scrutiny. Because the Emir of Kuwait
requested immediate U.S. assistance, the United States could have reacted mil-
itarily and attempted to drive Hussein and his forces out of Kuwait. 131 A problem
arose, however, when the United States considered the option of, not only
124. Miller, Confrontation in the Gulf: Doubts on Sanctions, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1990, at A8,
col. 5. While the Bush administration continued to assemble possible resolutions for Security Council
approval to pressure Iraq, U.S. leaders believed that article 51 authorized the nations to act aggres-
sively against Iraq.
125. Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force, 53 U. Ctu. L. REV. 113,
120-21 (1986) [hereinafter Schachter, In Defense of International Rules]. Schachter offered several
examples of actions that international law deemed to lack proportionality, including the bombing of
cities in response to a frontier raid or the occupying of the territory of a state because that state
illegally had assisted revolutionaries in a civil war.
126. Schachter, The Right of States, supra note 74, at 1637.
127. Id. Schachter noted that when a defensive maneuver exceeded the provocation in terms of
relative casualties or scale of weaponry, international law likely would consider the reaction to be
disproportionate to the initial attack.
128. Schachter, In Defense of International Rules, supra note 125, at 120.
129. Wallace, supra note 121, at 262. The concept of proportionality implies that a country can
use article 51 as a justification only until the aggression has been repelled. International law would
consider any actions beyond that point as acts of aggression not allowed under article 51.
130. Schachter, In Defense of International Rules, supra note 125, at 121. Occasions in which the
counterintervention was disproportionate included Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 1978, Syria's
invasion of Lebanon in 1976, and Libya's invasion of Chad in 1983.
131. See Scheffer, In the U.N. Charter, supra note 5, at 4, col. 3.
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driving the aggressors out of Kuwait, but attacking Iraq as well. That would
appear to have been the point at which international law would have drawn the
line of proportionality. Although the United States could have argued that a series
of attacks on a state warranted a counterattack against the source of the initial
aggression on a scale that would deter future attacks, international law likely
would not have condoned an all-out invasion of Iraq. 132 For an attack on Iraq to
be regarded as self-defensive within the doctrine of proportionality, the level of
weaponry used could not have exceeded the level that Iraq employed against
Kuwait. 133 However, the purpose of a full-scale invasion of Iraq would have
been to destroy Hussein and his army. 13 4 The United States could not have
rationalized such an action under the reasoning of collective self-defense unless
the peaceful measures embodied in the resolutions failed to remove Hussein and
the Security Council refused to or failed to reach a decision on authorizing
military action. '
35
The concept of proportionality limited the cards the United States could have
played in the Iraq-Kuwait situation. Within the confines of such a volatile set of
circumstances, to rely on a provision of the U.N. Charter that placed limits on
U.S. powers would not have been prudent. Had the United States immediately
taken direct action against Iraq in reliance on article 51 and driven the aggressors
out of Kuwait, those actions would have been justified. 136 In light of Hussein's
attitude and actions, however, it did not appear that the world could reap satis-
faction from merely driving him from Kuwait.' 37 For the sake of the stability of
the Middle East region, the United States and the other concerned nations had to
strike Iraq and attempt to break the resolve of Hussein and his army. To go to
such extremes, the United States could not rely on article 51 with its limits of
proportionality, but was forced to seek a greater source of power to provide
international legal justification for further actions against Iraq.
B. NECEssrrY
Closely connected to the concept of proportionality is the concept of necessity.
At its core, the idea of necessity is grounded in the belief that self-defense
132. Schachter, The Right of States, supra note 74, at 1638. Israel attempted such an argument in
1982 when it justified its military action deep into Lebanon territory by stating that it was acting in
self-defense against the PLO in Beirut and other cities because the PLO was the source of continuing
attacks on northern Israel. The United Nations rejected this argument.
133. Schachter, In Defense of International Rules, supra note 125, at 120.
134. See Zuckerman, Are We Willing to Act Alone, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Sept. 24, 1990,
at 100. Zuckerman commented that in light of Hussein's history of aggression, to have settled with
him on diplomatic terms would have been as bad as defeat. Although he might have been forced to
leave Kuwait, to have left him with his army would have allowed him to leave a winner.
135. Scheffer, In the U.N. Charter, supra note 4, at 4, col. 3.
136. Id.
137. Zuckerman, supra note 134.
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measures are purely preventive and not retributive in character. 138 According to
this concept, an individual nation acting in self-defense or other nations acting
under the power of collective self-defense, must act with the idea that the victim
state is in imminent danger.' 39 Thus, the concept of necessity contains a temporal
element. 140 Without a time limitation on when a country can resort to article 51
authority for of self-defense, the ability to act aggressively against a nation under
the guise of self-defense would envelope the article 2(4) prohibition on force
and render it meaningless. 141 Nevertheless, the problem of determining an iden-
tifiable temporal limitation on the ability to rely on article 51 should not subor-
dinate the requirement of necessity. 142 The concept of self-defense, by its very
definition, presupposes an immediate response to an invasion and not a response
planned and considered over the course of several months. '
43
Intertwined with the concept of necessity is the consideration that military
force should not be deemed necessary, in most cases, until the reacting nations
have implemented peaceful measures and given them the opportunity to suc-
ceed. 144 Before nations, acting through collective security, determine that mili-
tary force is necessary, they should first determine the likelihood that peaceful
measures will be effective in restoring peace and forcing the aggressors to depart
the invaded territory. 145 A counter to this argument is that to require a state to
allow an invasion without resisting militarily, but instead waiting to use peaceful
measures, nullifies the right of self-defense. 146 This counterargument, however,
is inapplicable to the Iraq-Kuwait situation because the United States and the
other nations did not react immediately in a military fashion, but implemented
the resolutions, which, for the most part, represented a peaceful attempt to
resolve the situation.
138. Kunz, supra note 89, at 332. Kunz analogized the concept of self-defense in international
law to the same concept in criminal law when he stated that an individual acting in self-defense
against an attacker merely defended himself. The individual harbored no aspirations to enforce the
law or punish the attacker, only to defend himself.
139. Schachter, The Right of States, supra note 74, at 1637.
140. Schachter, In Defense of International Rules, supra note 125, at 132. Schachter contended
that without a temporal limitation, article 51 justifications would authorize armed attacks for nu-
merous prior acts of aggression.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Harbottle, Letter: United Nations' Limits on Multi-National Actions to Defect Iraq, The
Independent, Sept. 12, 1990, at 20. With regard to the ability of the United States to mount an
offensive against Iraq under article 51, Harbottle observed
In the current situation, the multi-national force is deployed in Saudi-Arabia, at the Saudi Government's request,
to protect it against a possible aggression. Until such an aggression occurs, the multi-national force has no remit
to take offensive action itself, for were it to do so, such action could not be deemed to be acting in self-defense.
Since self-defense is, in its very interpretation, an immediate response to an act of war, it would be difficult to
justify any kind of combined sea, land, air operation to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait, even if requested by the
Kuwaiti government.
144. Schachter, The Right of States, supra note 74, at 1635.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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The necessity requirement implicit in article 51 further limited U.S. ability to
act militarily under that provision. The United States allowed too much time to
pass following the initial invasion by Iraq to allow it to contend that it was
attacking the Iraqi forces in collective self-defense of Kuwait.' 4 7 The imposition
of the resolutions required the reacting nations to wait and determine their pos-
sibility of success. Had Iraq invaded Saudi Arabia, the United States would have
been justified in invoking article 51 to repel the Iraqi forces because under
international law that action would have been a matter of necessity.14 8 With
respect to Kuwait, however, the United States lost its opportunity to act in
collective self-defense against Iraq when it failed to react immediately.
C. UNTIL THE SECURITY COUNCIL AcTs
While the concepts of proportionality and necessity implicitly restricted pos-
sible aggressive U.S. actions against Iraq under article 51, the language of the
provision explicitly limited the United States. 149 If interpreted literally, article 51
authorizes only a temporary use of self-defense by nations acting on behalf of a
victim state through collective security.' 50 The U.N. Charter explicitly recog-
nizes the right of self-defense in the event of an armed attack of a member, but
only until such time as the Security Council invokes measures for the mainte-
nance of international peace and security.' 51 Article 51 provides the reacting
nations with the immediate power to respond at the request of and on the behalf
of the victim state. 152 After the nations react under the authority of article 51, the
Security Council has the responsibility and the authority to take the necessary
measures to restore the peace.' 
5 3
If the United States had attempted to use article 51 to justify an attack on Iraq,
the United States would have acted in direct contravention of the provision itself.
147. See generally Scheffer, In the U.N. Charter, supra note 5, at 4, col. 3.
148. See Kramer, The Case Against Nukes, TIME, Oct. 8, 1990, at 39. "Without the luxury of
a further provocation from Iraq-an invasion of Saudi Arabia, the killing of Western hostages or
some other horror-it may fall to the Kuwaiti Emir to request that the United Nations act militarily."
Id.
149. Schachter, Self-Defense and the Rule of Law, supra note 122, at 263.
150. Wallace, supra note 121, at 262. Wallace noted that in the words of the U.N. Charter itself,
acts of collective self-defense shall be "immediately reported to the Security Council and shall
not in any way affect the authority and the responsibility of the Security Council..." and such acts
of collective self-defense shall continue "until the Security Council has taken the [necessary]
measures .....'."
151. L. GOODRICH, supra note 13, at 345.
152. Scheffer, The United Nations in the Gulf Crisis, supra note 9, at 6. In describing the
collective right of self-defense, Scheffer noted that the ICJ has construed this right as allowing a state
to use military force in support of another state provided the state under siege deemed itself to be
under attack and made a request for assistance.
153. Kunz, supra note 89, at 333. In interpreting the language of article 51, Kunz determined that
once the Security Council has acted in response to the aggression, the provisional stage of individual
and collective self-defense has terminated and the stage of collective sanctions under the exclusive
authority of the Security Council has begun.
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The drafters of the U.N. Charter considered self-defense as an interim right that
a member state could exercise only until the Security Council assumed its re-
sponsibility for remedying the situation.' 54 The United States, in effect, would
have circumvented the responsibility of maintaining international peace granted
to the Security Council in the U.N. Charter. 15 5 The United States was justified
under article 51 in implementing economic sanctions against Iraq and deploying
military forces to Saudi Arabia in the name of collective self-defense. 156 Nev-
ertheless, because the United States intended to employ offensive military means
to attack Iraq, the language of the provision required the United States to defer
to the Security Council and to allow it to pursue its responsibilities.
IV. Aggression Against Iraq: The Responsibility
of the Security Council
A. AGREEMENT BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL
Although the inherent limitations in article 51 provide solid support for the
argument that the United States wisely did not rely on that provision in its attack
on Iraq, the Security Council had another reason to shoulder its responsibilities.
The four other permanent members of the Security Council, especially the Soviet
Union, had indicated that they would support military action against Iraq only if
the Security Council authorized the action.157
When the allied forces met in San Francisco in 1945 to establish some form of
world order, one of their purposes was to ensure that nations would not employ
armed force unless it was utilized for the common interest.' 58 The Security
Council received the responsibility and authority to determine the existence of
threats to peace and to decide what collective steps it would employ to repel
the aggression. 159 As evidenced by the numerous acts of aggression since 1945,
the Security Council has failed in its capacity as the United Nations' principal
body for international peace-keeping.' 60 The main hurdle the Security Council
continually has failed to overcome in applying Chapter VII to repel aggression
has been the requirement that to act, nine of the fifteen Security Council mem-
bers must assent, including the five permanent members.' 6' The ever present
ability of one of the five permanent members to veto any Security Council action
154. Intoccia, supra note 102, at 203.
155. Harbottle, supra note 143, at 20.
156. La Guardia, Lawyers Divided on Freeing Kuwait From Occupation, Daily Telegraph,
Sept. 7, 1990, at 15.
157. N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1990, at C3, col. 1.
158. Franek, Who Killed Article 2(4) or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by States,
in INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 376 (R. Falk, F. Kratochwil & S. Men-
dolvitz eds. 1985).
159. Id. at 377.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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has limited its ability to react militarily in a unified manner to a threat to inter-
national peace. 1
62
The inability of the Security Council to agree on matters of international peace
and security was directly linked to the existence of the Cold War.' 63 Thus, the
agreement to admonish Hussein's actions and pass the twelve resolutions re-
sulted, in part, from the end of the formal Cold War. 164 The United States and
the Soviet Union appeared to agree that action was necessary to protect both
countries' interests in the region.1 65 The Soviet Union's Foreign Minister ex-
pressed his country's position on the situation when he stated that the Soviets
would comply with any resolution of the Security Council, including the orga-
nization of Soviet troops under the U.N. flag against Iraq. 166 Although the
Chinese expressed possible disapproval of military action against Iraq, officials
in the Bush administration believed that ultimately they would approve an ag-
gressive action out of a need to gain more global legitimacy.167 The Chinese,
unfortunately, failed to approve Resolution 678; instead, they abstained from the
vote, which does not have the same effect as a veto.' 
68
The general agreement in the Security Council did not indicate support for a
unilateral action by the United States under article 51. As noted, the Soviets, in
particular, indicated clearly that they would support the use of force against Iraq
only if approved by the Security Council. 169 The United States also was sensitive
to the legal opinions of the other members of the Security Council because a
condemnation of illegality under international law could have had detrimental
political effects.' 70 Condemnations of illegality by other nations can transform
the image of a great power from a protector of national independence to that of
a threat to the freedom of weaker nations. 171
Although action against Iraq based on article 51 undoubtedly would have
resulted in censure of the United States by other members, the United States had
a more compelling reason to rely on the Security Council. By allowing the
162. Id. The U.N. military action in Korea would not have occurred had the Soviet Union not
been boycotting the Security Council. The Soviet boycott was a response to Taiwan's continued
holding of the China seat on the Security Council. The Soviets surely would have vetoed any military
action in Korea.
163. U.S., Soviet Union Explore U.N. Command for Gulf Forces, United Press Int'l, Oct. 4,
1990, International Section. In the wire report the U.S. Assistant Secretary for International Affairs
said that the committee, created upon the United Nations' founding in 1945, was "dead on arrival
because of Cold War tension."
164. Strasser, supra note 4, at 1.
165. Id.
166. Curtius, U.S., U.S.S.R. Reported Closer on Gulf Force, Boston Globe, Oct. 1, 1990, at 1.
167. Davies, Allies Test U.N. Cover for Military Action, Daily Telegraph, Oct. 2, 1990, at 15.
168. L.A. Times, Nov. 30, 1990, at At, col. 6. The Chinese delegation claimed that the absten-
tion arose from its "difficulty in voting for the resolution because it authorized the use of force."
169. N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1990, at D3, col. 1.
170. Schachter, In Defense of International Rules, supra note 125, at 123.
171. Id.
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Security Council the opportunity to carry out its responsibilities, the United
Nations, and the Security Council specifically, could emerge from the Iraq-
Kuwait situation stronger than before. 172 Had the United States acted unilaterally
under article 51, not only would other nations have criticized its actions, but
such a move would have weakened the power of the Security Council. As
President Bush commented on the Iraqi situation at the Helsinki Summit with
Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union in September 1990: "If the nations of the
world, acting together, continue as they have been, we will set in place the
cornerstone of an international order more peaceful than any that we have
known." 173 Because Hussein acted so blatantly against the principles established
by the U.N. Charter, his country stood alone. Iraq's dictator thus provided the
appropriate setting for the Security Council to unify and to act against him. 174
Not to have allowed the Security Council to assume its primary responsibility of
maintaining international peace would have established a detrimental pattern in
future international crisis situations. 175
B. ALTERNATIVE FOR ENFORCEMENT
Prior to acting aggressively against Iraq, the United States waited for the
Security Council to employ article 42 of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter as
justification for an attack on Iraq. 176 As noted, the Security Council passed seven
of the twelve resolutions against Iraq pursuant to Chapter VII of the charter. 177
Article 42 authorizes the Security Council to permit military action when it
determines that trade sanctions have proven inadequate. 178 The Soviet Union
implied repeatedly that it would support an action under article 42.179
The Security Council chose to provide itself with a certain amount of latitude
by relying generally on Chapter VII rather than specifically on article 42 when
drafting Resolution 678. 18 An action under article 42 would have raised ques-
tions among the permanent members of the Security Council such as: whether to
activate the Military Staff Committee under article 47,181 as the Soviets desired;
172. Strasser, supra note 4, at 1.
173. Church, A New World, TIME, Sept. 17, 1990, at 20.
174. Strasser, supra note 4, at 1.
175. Id.
176. Scheffer, In the U.N. Charter, supra note 5, at 4, col. 3.
177. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
178. U.N. CHARTER art. 42:
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved
to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air,
sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.
179. U.S., Soviet Union Explore U.N. Command for Gulf Forces, United Press Int'l, Oct. 4,
1990, International Section.
180. See Bone, U.N. Sets for Historic Recourse to Force, The Times (London), Nov. 27, 1990,
at 12, col. 3.
181. U.N. CHARTER art. 47, para. 1:
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whether the United States, Britain, and France would command their own forces;
and whether using the provision would destroy any element of surprise over Iraq.
Acting under article 42 would have represented a strict adherence to the letter of
the U.N. Charter. 182 Commentators have speculated that the United States and
Great Britain resisted relying upon article 42 because of subsequent articles that
relate to article 42.183 Two later articles, 46 and 47, require that any military
action taken according to article 42 proceed under an organized U.N. com-
mand. 184 These two provisions make reference to the use of the Military Staff
Committee to organize and coordinate operations.' 85 The United States, having
provided the largest contingent of forces, likely was not willing to allow a U.N.
Military Staff Committee command U.S. troops. By invoking the phrase, "all
necessary means," Resolution 678 made an indirect reference to article 42 with-
out encountering all of the legal requirements required in the subsequent provi-
sions. 186 Resolution 678 reflected an awareness by the United States and the
other proponents of force that article 51 was not sufficient for an attack on Iraq,
while at the same time it reflected a United States desire to maintain control of
the operation against Iraq.
V. Conclusion
By invading Kuwait, Iraq violated numerous principles of international law.
The U.S. employment of article 51 presented Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and sur-
rounding Arab nations with the reassurance that the U.S. was prepared to act in
collective self-defense of those countries. Despite the rhetoric of United States
officials, however, article 51, according to the legal principles established in the
U.N. Charter, could not provide the ultimate remedy to those countries-the
destruction of the Iraqi forces and the restoration of peace.
Article 51 is purely a self-defense mechanism limited by proportionality,
necessity, and the actions of the Security Council. Its application by the United
States in past situations raised criticisms and condemnations that could have
arisen again if the United States had improperly employed it against Iraq. To
invoke a questionably legal provision in light of the unified disapproval against
Them shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions
relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the
employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.
182. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1990, at D3, col. 1.
183. Bone, supra note 180, at 12, col. 3.
184. Id. Bone noted:
The United States and Britain have resisted explicitly invoking Article 42 because of the U.N. machinery it is
thought to entail. Subsequent articles make clear that article 42 action requires U.N. command. Article 46 says,
for instance, that "plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the security council with the assistance
of the military staff committee," a panel made up of military officers from the five powers, the United States, the
Soviet Union, Britain, France, and China.
See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
185. Bone, supra note 180, at 12, col. 3.
186. Id.
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Iraq would have made neither legal nor political sense. The drafters of the U.N.
Charter, in their desire to establish world peace, allowed for situations such as
the Iraq-Kuwait situation. Chapter VII of the charter provides the Security Coun-
cil with several options in dealing with a recalcitrant nation, including the right
to authorize unified military action against it. Allowing the Security Council to
implement these provisions through Resolution 678 benefitted not only Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia, and the Middle East region, but the concept of international world
order as embodied in the U.N. Charter.
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